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B.: Mistake of Law--Recovery of Money Paid Under Such Mistake
CASE COMMENTS
defendant was protected by indemnity insurance. In the instant
case there was no other way to attack the witness's credibility except
by asking the question in the presence of the jury. On this basis
the two cases are distinguishable.
It is interesting to note that there is another exception to the
general rule. Where the defendant denies control of the injuring
instrumentality, evidence that he carried indemnity insurance to
protect himself if anyone were injured by the instrumentality may
come in to show his control over that instrumentality. Barg v.
Bousfield, 65 Minn. 355, 68 N.W. 45 (1896); Perkins v. Rice, 187
Mass. 28, 72 N.E. 323 (1904). It is hardly likely that the defendant
would carry indemnity insurance on an instrumentality over which
he has no control.
The West Virginia court implies in its opinion that if such
witness was P's witness in chief, it would constitute reversible error
for the indemnity insurance fact to be disclosed, which is to say
that bD should not have brought this particular witness into the
case at all, and having done so, must bear the consequences of it.
G. W. G.
MISTAKE OF LAW-RECOvERY OF MONEY PAID UNDER SUCH MIS-

TAKE.-P borrowed $4,000 from H, giving a negotiable promissory
note secured by a trust deed conveying certain realty. H employed
D, an attorney, for collection purposes and P paid D installments
amounting to $500, receiving receipts from him. D applied this
sum to debts owing him from H. Subsequently P sold the real
property and sought a necessary immediate release of the lien. H
refused to release until the amount withheld by D was credited on
the debt. P then paid an additional $500 to H and received the
release, and later instituted a notice of motion for judgment proceeding against H and D to recover the $500.
D entered a special plea, to which P demurred. The demurrer
was sustained. The matter being submitted on the pleadings,
the trial court entered judgment against H and D. The supreme
court granted a writ of error to D, H having made no defense
below. The court found no contractual basis for the proceeding
against D and reversed, overruling P's demurrer. Case v. Shepherd,
84 S.E.2d 140 (W. Va. 1954).
D's special plea contended that P showed no contract, express
or implied, between D and P and that the payment to H constituted
a voluntary payment made with full knowledge of all material
facts at the time and no recovery should be permitted.
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The court found from the facts in the record that there was
no express contract between P and D that D was to refund the $500
to P under any circumstances; and further that there was no
"meeting of the minds" necessary for the creation of an implied
contract between P and H whereby D agreed to refund to P. There
was, therefore, no right to recovery against D under W. VA. CODM
c. 56, art. 2, § 6 (Michie, 1949), providing for notice of motion for
judgment proceedings based upon contractual obligations and the
court so held; reversing the trial court and overruling Ps demurrer
to D's special plea.
In stating another basis for precluding recovery the court held
P chargeable with knowledge of the rule of law that payment to an
agent is payment to the principal; and that therefore the second
payment to H was made under a mistake of law and could not be
recovered from D. While this is a dictum because it was not
necessary to the disposition of the case, it is interesting to note that
the court inserted the point into the syllabus. Query: Whether
this is the law of the case? See Hardman, "The Law"-In West
Virginia, 47 W. VA. L.Q. 23 (1940); Hardman, "The Syllabus is
the Law"', 47 W. VA. L.Q. 141 (1941), and Hardman, "The Syllabus
is the Law"-Another Word, 47 W. VA. L.Q. 209 (1941) for. a
discussion of this point.
The principle that money paid under a mistake of law cannot
be recovered is firmly established in the decisions of the West
Virginia court and the majority of other American courts. Alderson
v. Gauley Fuel Co., 116 W. Va. 95, 178 S.E. 626 (1935); Coburn v.
Neal, 94 Me. 541, 48 AtI. 178 (1901); Morgan Park v.Knopf, 199
Ill. 444, 65 N.E. 322 ((1902); RESTATEMENT, REsTrrtiTlON, SEAVEY
8: Scorrs NoTEs §§ 44, 45 (1937). Had the point been necessary
to decide in the principal case, the court would have had a choice
of following earlier decisions or of reversing an entire line of
precedents, which are cited in the opinion. The dictum factor
makes the question academic, yet it is submitted that the rule
above stated is not a sound one.
Historically, the doctrine that money paid under a mistake of
law cannot be recovered dates back some 153 years. It first appeared in Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East 469 (1802). There Lord
Ellenborough apparently rested his refusal to allow restitution
upon the ground that "everyone must be taken to be cognizant of
the law." This was an unwarranted distortion of the rule that
"ignorance of the law is no excuse" for the commission of a crime
or of a tort. The later English case of Brisbane v. Dacres, 5
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Taunt. 143 (G.P. 1813), followed the rule thus laid down and the
spadework was done; courts followed the two precedents without
analysis. It is interesting to note that Lord Ellenborough himself
seemed to take a different view of his opinion than did others who
read it, since in 1811 in the case of Perrott v. Perrott, 14 East 423,
104 Eng. Rep. 665 (K.B. 1811), he allowed relief against a mistake
of law. This, of course, tends to show that no absolute general
principle was intended to apply in civil cases. In criminal or tort
cases the reason for the rule is apparent, since one should never
be allowed to excuse an act resulting in the commission of a crime
or in damage to another party by asserting a -mere mistake as to
knowledge of the rule of law applicable.
However, in civil cases, no apparent basis for the rule exists
with the exception of the lame precedent set down by Lord Ellenborough. For an interesting but brief discussion of the topic, see
RFSTATEMENT, RESTIrTUTON 179 et seq. (1937).
The rule is generally justified by blanket assertions that any
other course would cause insecurity in contractual relations plus
numerous other generally undesirable results. See, for example,
RESTATEMENT, RESTr=UTON

§ 45. At least two states have refused

to follow the Ellenborough rule from its beginning, and without
apparent disastrous after effects. McMurty v. Kentucky Central Ry.,
84 Ky. 462, 1 S.W. 815 (1886). Northrop v. Graves, 19 Conn. 548,
50 Am. Dec. 264 (1849).
Other states have attempted to abolish the distinction between
a mistake of law and one of fact by statute. See Note, 13 NonTE
DAmE LAW.

215 (1938).

It has been suggested that if an injustice has been done in a
transaction and one part r has received money which in equity and
good conscience he shoi~ld not retain, the demand of finality of
transaction, however desirable, should not be controlling but
should give way to justie. Note, 9 VA. L. REv. 220 (1923).
It is notable that the West Virginia court in the principal case
speaks of implied contracts only. An implied contract is a true
contract arising out of an implication of fact in which the meeting
of intentions of the parties is a fact legitimately inferred from conduct, the intention being ascertained and enforced and the contract
defining the duty. Estate of John C. Gilbert, 115 W. Va. 599, 177
S.E: 529 (1934); First Nat'l Bank v. Mattock, 99 Okla. 150, 226
Pac. 328 (1924).
It is quite probable that counsel made no mention of quasi
contracts in the principal case, although certainly this classification
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suits the situation at hand rather than implied contracts. Quasi
contracts are in reality not contracts at all since they do not rest
upon a meeting of intentions, expressed by words or by conduct,
but are obligations created by a legal fiction in order to do justice.
Bicknell v. Garrett, 1 Wash.2d 564, 96 P.2d 592 (1939). This legal
fiction was invented by the common law courts in order to permit
a recovery in an action of assumpsit in cases where there is in fact
no contract, but the circumstances are such that under the law of
natural justice there should be a recovery as though there had been
a promise. Clark v. People's Say. & L. Ass"n, 221 Ind. 168, 46
N.E.2d 681 (1943). The West Virginia court draws this distinction
between implied contracts and quasi contracts in Johnson v. Nat'l,
Bank, 124 W. Va. 157, 19 S.E.2d 441 (1942).
There seems to be no theory under which P could recover the
500 from D. At the time collections were made by D there was
a valid outstanding obligation to H owing by P, and payment to the
agent is without doubt payment to the principal. The only questionable payment made was that of P to H to secure the release of
the trust deed upon P's property, and this transaction in no way
involved D. The court states that it was not here concerned with
P's right to recover from H. Admittedly the result of the court's
decision is correct, and merely a secondary basis for so holding is
questionable, though firmly substantiated under the doctrine of
stare decisis. It is submitted that the court should overrule the
precedents and abolish the unreasonable distinction between mistakes of law and of fact.
H. C. B., Jr.
CAPACITY.-P filed a
union. Ds, by a
a
certain
of'
trustees
declaration suing Ds, "as
special plea, alleged that the process was served against them as
individuals, so that to suffice, the action had to be against all the
members of the union. The court cited Milan v. Settle, 127 W. Va.
270, 20 S.E.2d 269 (1944), indicating that the failure to use "as"
showed a desire to sue Ds in individual capacity. Since "as" was
present in this declaration and since the court found the action to
be against Ds in their representative capacity, it would seem that
the use of "as" denotes, to the court's satisfaction, the intent to sue
one in his representative capacity. However, the court went on
to hold that the capacity of a plaintiff or defendant in a suit is
"to be determined from all the allegations of the pleading."
Marion v. Chandler, 81 S.E.2d 89 (W .Va. 1954).
PLEADING AND PRACTICE-REPRSENTATIVE
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